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1Economic Distress and Discourse: the Rise of a Corporatist
Rhetoric in Northern Spain after World War I
Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal(*)
University of Manchester
This paper analyzes the process of construction and interpretation of the corporatist
discourse during World War I and the post-war crisis. Our case study focuses on the
Basque Country, a region in Northern Spain. This region underwent from the 1870s
an intense process of industrial growth based on mining and heavy industry. I argue
that the economic and social conditions derived from an exogenous factor as the
European war were what determined the basic characteristics of the production
process of the corporatist discourse after 1917. The discourse is conceived as an
instrument that the economic elite with a stake in heavy industry used to promote the
institutional change that was necessary to overcome a situation of stress in economic
affairs. The study therefore suggests that the discourse's production process is
determined by socioeconomic factors. In short, it is proposed that, faced with the
current trend in certain social sciences, more attention should be paid to the context
rather than to the text. The work is thoroughly interdisciplinary with regard to
approaches and methodology. The author is convinced of the basic uniqueness of the
social sciences. The relationship between economics, language and communication
are being explored in this case.
The paper has been divided into three sections. The first one examines the
economic context during the war and post-war years, by using the latest available data
on domestic and regional industrial production. Below is an analysis of the corporatist
discourse's main characteristics. For this, I have used some analysis tools used in
sociolinguistics. The third section gives a more in-depth study of the interaction
between text and context. Finally, the most relevant conclusions are stated.
1. The Context: Economic Distress during the War Cycle
(*)Financed by a postdoctoral research grant awarded by the Department of Education, Basque
Government. Research Project SEJ2006-08188/ECON, Spanish Ministry of Education.
2World War I brought profound transformation to the Spanish economy. The war
caused a drastic reduction in imports of manufactured goods that had traditionally
come from countries that were now belligerent: Britain, France and Germany. This
meant automatic protection for the industry, much more effective than any previous
trade or tariff policy. It enabled Spanish companies to do business with the home
market, without any foreign competition. Furthermore, wartime provisioning needs
and productive bottlenecks in countries at war meant an increase in the demand aimed
at neutral countries. Not only was this demand for arms, but also goods to replenish
the damaged infrastructures, outfit troops (textile industry, leather industry) and
supply raw mineral materials.1
However, the Basque industry had a hard time capitalizing on the favourable
situation. The companies were still dependent on importing English coal and other
basic inputs.2 Receipt of these goods became quite irregular due to disruptions in
shipping. The arrival of technological equipment was also halted due to the obstacles
that belligerent governments imposed on granting export licenses. The collapse of the
Spanish railway system and the disappearance of coastal shipping made it difficult to
replace it with products manufactured on the home market. In short, a situation of
strong foreign and domestic demand, and an inelastic supply. The attempt to solve the
supply bottlenecks to capitalize on the exceptional circumstances was the
fundamental strategy that Basque industrialists employed between 1914 and 1920.
We could summarize them as follows: self-sufficiency policies such as installing
ovens in order not to depend on the supply from other companies; building factories
to manufacture inputs that used to be imported; acquisition of coal mines in Asturias
or León to replace English coal; creation of merchant fleets to ship ore; purchase of
rolling stock; investment in production lines or industries that only had a demand
based on the current favourable situation; or acquisition at high prices of nearly
obsolete fixed assets. In general, there was investment in predominantly “old” and
cartelized industries such as iron and steel, metallurgy, paper or certain areas of the
mechanical industry.
1 Roldán, García Delgado and Muñoz (1973), Pelechá Zozaya (1975), García Delgado (1983), Tortella
(1994).
2 See Coll and Sudriá (1987).
3These strategies failed. The large iron and steel factories were not able to
expand their production on a sufficient scale to satisfy the growing demand of the
national transformation industry. They were even less capable of exporting. Some
small, specialized metallurgical companies and the arms industry were the ones that
managed to export part of their output —primarily to France, and fundamentally in
1916 and 1917. In no way did Basque industry exhibit the exportation drive that
Catalonian industry did. The war expansion in the case of the Basque region was
basically a profit inflation. This was possible thanks to the home market's price
increase that compensated the increase in output costs.3 The inflationary spiral started
to accelerate in mid 1917, and industrial company profits skyrocketed in the second
semester of that year and first semester of 1918. The main Spanish industrial
company, Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, that already manufactured its commercial
products at the Sestao factory with margins (difference between the cost price and the
sales price) of around 60 % in the second semester of 1916 and 80% in the first
semester of 1917, surpassed the 200% mark for several months between the second
half of 1917 and the first quarter of 1918.4 Nevertheless, though they were important,
industrial profits were much less than those of the shipping industry. 5
FIGURE 1 HERE
The available industrial output data confirm the difficulties the industry
underwent during the war cycle. As can be observed in Figure 1, the two existing
indices for the Basque region (IPIEUZ and IPIPV) show a dip in industrial output
between 1914 and 1922. This dip was produced in two phases. The first phase in
1917-1918 has to do with inelasticities of the supply already mentioned. The second
one, in 1921-1922, is related to the post-war economic crisis. When the automatic
protection that war had provided disappeared, German or French imports —spurred in
addition by the fall of the mark and the franc— affected the local companies. Basque
industry had suffered a strong decline in production costs due to the self-sufficiency
3 Roldán, García Delgado and Muñoz (1973), Palafox (1991).
4 Calculated with Houpt (1998), vol. II. See also González Portilla (1994).
5 See Tafunell (1998).
4and investment strategies of previous years.6 Though we do not have productivity
data for all of Basque industry, the quantitative information provided by some
sectorial studies, together with the fact that the decline in industrial output occurred
during a period of an increase of 15 or 20 percentage points in the labour force in the
secondary industry of Basque coastal provinces, suggests a very pronounced drop in
productivity.7 Actually, the industrial output per inhabitant in Catalonia surpassed in
1917 the industrial output per person in the Basque region, for the first time since
1890.8
In short, the evolution of Basque industrial output highlighted a breakaway in
1914 from its trend since 1890. It also showed a clear divergence with regard to the
evolution of the Catalonian (IPICAT) and the whole of Spain's industrial output
(IPIE). As may be observed in the graph, the Catalonian index and the Spanish Prados
index act quite similarly. It is true that the decline in iron mining forced the Basque
index downward. However, it did so moderately and did not overly modify the basic
evolution of, for instance, the iron and steel industry. This sector's output, as can be
seen in the graph with the data of the major Spanish iron and steel company (Altos
Hornos de Vizcaya), acts similarly to the IPIPV or IPIEUZ.
Toward 1920, heavy industry in Northern Spain had many problems. The
return to normality and the arrival of imports from European countries with devalued
currencies began to narrow sales margins in the second semester of that year. Output
could not be recovered. During the war, it had fallen due to the productive
bottlenecks. In the post-war years, it fell even more due to foreign competition. Faced
with growing difficulties, Basque industrialists requested the government to restore
tariffs and other protective policies.9 However, the industry's structure had been
substantially modified between 1914 and 1920. The artificial signals issued by the
market during the war and self-sufficiency policies had caused companies to be
created in old industries or steep investments to be made in expanding other existent
companies. As a result of the saturation, overcapitalization and a general decline in
production cost, the traditional tariff policy was not sufficient for Basque
6 In 1921 and 1922 Spanish imports reached the highest values for the period 1900-1950. Fraile (1985):
99. For the Spanish economy during the interwar period, Comín (1987), Houpt and Rojo Cagigal
(2006).
7 Data on labour force in Olábarri (1978): 447; Luengo (1990): 232. Sectorial studies in Houpt (1998).
8 Carreras (1985): 207.
9 Basque businessmen´s pressure on Madrid, in Harrison (1978): 85-86.
5industrialists. Now they needed to implement expansive budget policies: subsidies for
building new railroads or renewing material, naval contracts and extensive public
works.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Stock prices constitute a good indicator of investors' confidence. They reflect
the value given by the market, with the available information at that time, to stocks.
In Figure 2, we can observe the evolution of stock prices for Altos Hornos de Vizcaya
between 1913 and 1930. Due to the impact of the post-war crisis, nominal prices
decreased in 1921 to pre-war levels. The evolution of prices in real terms are
surprising: in 1918 and 1919 alone, the deflated series exceeded the 1913 level. That
confirms what we stated in the preceding paragraph on the difficulties of Basque
wartime industry. Data from the most important railroad company in Spain,
Compañía del Norte, are also quite eloquent. One must bear in mind that between
1916 and 1918, Spanish investors acquired the greater part of this railroad company's
stock on the Paris Stock Exchange. The so called “rescue” of stocks and bonds owned
by foreigners was basically led by Basque and Catalonian investors. It was mainly led
by the former, and especially by two local banks: Banco de Bilbao and Banco de
Vizcaya. They believed that it would constitute a profitable investment from the
profits obtained during the war. In 1920, it was calculated that one fifth of Compañía
del Norte's shares were already in the hands of Basque investors.10
However, the European war brought on chronic congestion of railroads. This
entailed a lack of wagons and locomotives, difficulties maintaining railroad tracks
and an increase in labour costs and fuel. All of this, together with the fact that the
government froze rail fares, put pressure on companies' profit and loss accounts.
Precisely one of the most affected companies was Compañía del Norte. This turned
the “rescue” into a disastrous operation for investors. As can be observed in Figure 2,
10 Lazúrtegui (1920): 206. On the “rescue”, Roldán, García Delgado and Muñoz (1973): 333-337;
Muñoz, Roldán and Serrano (1978): 187-188. See also Julio Lazúrtegui :“La elevación de las tarifas
ferroviarias y nuestro general problema de circulación, I y II”, Información , January 29th, 1920: 35-36,
February 14th: 67-68. Julio Lazúrtegui: “El pleito ferroviario en España”, Información , April 14th,
1920: 205-207.
6the price of its shares plummeted starting in 1916. It reached very low prices; in real
terms below half their 1913 worth.
Thus, the new post-war circumstances now required not only a protectionist
tariff policy but also a substantial increase in rail fares, government railroad subsidies
and, above all, an increase in public spending and orientation toward large works with
multiplying effects on the heavy industry demand. Except for the rail fare issue, the
rest was something that had always been a part of the Basque pressure group's
agenda. However, the change that had taken place between 1914 and 1920 —
saturation of old industries, an excess of capitalization and a decline in costs— made
it essential, not only to the short term, but also as a mid to long-term survival strategy.
2. Building the text: formation of corporatist discourse
Due to the rise of the discourse theory, the term “discourse” has been generalized in
many social science disciplines. Discourse is linguistic communication seen as a
transaction between speaker and hearer, as an interpersonal activity whose form is
determined by its social purpose. Discourse is basically interactive, implies certain
length and presents a deeper coherence. Discourses are regulated groupings of
statements that have their own internal rules.11 In many works, there is no appreciable
difference between the terms “discourse” and “ideology”. Some authors prefer to use
the former due to its greater political correctness. Although they may roughly mean
the same, in this article we use the word “discourse” associated with a group of
utterances that have less formal coherence —somewhat vaguer than an “ideology”. If
we follow the divisions suggested by Aristotelic triumvirate of logic, dialectic and
rhetoric, corporatist discourse may be also called “rhetoric”. Aristotle defined the
rhetorical sense of an argument as a persuasive process, paying attention to the means
used in argumentative communications between arguer and audience. 12
Discourses are socially constructed. The construction process is quite variable
with regard to the duration, intensity and continuity. In this section, I analyze the
corporatist discourse formation process during World War I and the post-war crisis.
11 See Mills (2004): 3-5, 43.
12 Tindale (2004): 5; Harré (1985): 128-129.
7The channels for disseminating corporatism were politicians’ speeches, articles in the
daily press, articles in economics magazines and books published by intellectuals.
With the purpose of verifying the variations in discursive structures that arose during
the period in the Basque region, I have used some quantitative and qualitative
analysis methods used by sociolinguistic researchers.13 These methods, thanks to the
use of computers and specially designed software, allow researchers to work with a
corpus of words and obtain lists of occurrences of a word, frequency lists, keyword
analyses in context (in a sentence, in a paragraph), collocations of a word,
concordances and rankings.14
In order to determine the changes that occurred in text output, I have selected
and digitized all articles related to the economy that appeared in four Basque daily
newspapers: El Nervión, El Noticiero Bilbaíno, El Pueblo Vasco and La Gaceta del
Norte. I have done the same with a financial magazine called Información, that
belonged to the Bilbao Chamber of Commerce. This magazine was published twice
monthly. In short, I have concentrated on the media in Vizcaya province. The local
economic elite were the owners of most of these companies. The conservative and
monarchist El Nervión and El Pueblo Vasco belonged to the Gandarias, Ybarra and
Bergé families, which were tied to heavy industry and large scale banking. Major
industrialists also made their mark on the Chamber of Commerce magazine's editorial
line. The Catholic integrist La Gaceta del Norte was linked as well to the economic
elite —Chalbaud, Lezama-Leguizamón, Basterra. El Noticiero Bilbaíno was more
independent, and could be defined as petit burgeois. The socialist El Liberal and the
Basque nationalist Euzkadi have not been included in our sample.
After digitizing the texts, I have selected a series of indicators or markers that
denote economic nationalism, anti-competition rhetoric or corporatist rhetoric. To
compare them at different moments, I have created two corpora corresponding to the
years 1914-1916 and 1920-1922. The first corpus contains 59.024 words (tokens) and
the second one 228.344 words. The differences concerning the size of the two
samples are simply due to the fact that more texts with an economic content were
published in the second period. The size of both samples is sufficient to be
13 On discourse analysis, Phillips and Hardy (2002), Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), Gee (2005),
Paltridge (2006).
14 They are known as key-word-in-context (KWIC) systems or computer-assisted-qualitative-data-
analysis software (CAQDAS). See Yates (2001): 110-115.
8statistically significant. However, the very selection of texts, that always has a
subjective nature, constitutes the main methodological problem.
It should be clarified that a systematized corporatist ideological corpus did not
exist in Spain until the late 1920s or early 1930s. Some members of the intellectual
elite knew Severino Aznar's work El régimen corporativo del porvenir (1916), or the
work of some foreign corporatist writers such as the Frenchman Georges Valois.15
From 1920 or 1921, many writers were in step with the postulates of an Italian breed
of fascism that was explicitly corporatist. Nevertheless, a more or less developed
system of ideas did not appear on the scene until the late twenties or early thirties,
with theorists such as Joaquín Azpiazu. At the beginning of the 1920s there was a
vague group of ideas. However, these ideas had enough structure and coherence to be
called corporatist discourse. It is also necessary to clarify that not all of the authors
were from the Basque region. Newspapers frequently published articles written by
intellectuals from Catalonia or Madrid. Often they would be previously published in
magazines such as El Economista or El Financiero, or in conservative newspapers
such as La Época. Even so, Basque intellectuals such as Julio de Lazúrtegui, Pedro de
Otaduy, Joaquín Adán, Amadeo de Mendiluce or Ramón de Basterra led the scene.
Figures 3 and 4 show some of the results from our exercise. In Figure 3, I have
selected some indicators that denote nationalism such as the frequency of usage of the
words “Spain”, “Spanish” and their derivations of gender and number. Between 1914
and 1916, the word “Spain” was used in 3.02‰ of our sample, whereas it was used in
4.86‰ of the second period. It went from ninth to fourth place of the words with
meaning. The word “nation”, “national” and their plural in Spanish were also used
more between 1920 and 1922 than during the previous period. Another indicator of
nationalism is “our” and its derivations. They were also used more frequently after
World War I. Thus, nationalism became a basic ingredient of corporatist discourse. It
fit in with economic protectionism, and was useful for attenuating the class conflict.
In the end, the European war seemed to have demonstrated that at the moment of
truth, national solidarity had prevailed against class solidarity. As can be observed in
Figure 3, the word “worker” [obrero] and derivations became less frequent after
15 In 1920 the newspaper El Financiero translated a chapter of Valois´s L´economie nouvelle. George
Valois: “De las llamadas “Confederaciones Generales del Patronato””, El Financiero, n. 984, February
6th, 1920: 187-188. About Valois, Williamson (1985). Some Basque corporatist intellectuals in Plata
(1991): 26-58.
9World War I. The same occurred with “class” and the plural form. Use of the
expression “working class” [clase obrera] is also less frequent: from 16 occurrences
in 1914-1916 (0.27‰) to 29 in 1920-1922 (0.13‰). The use of other words such as
“laborer(s)” [trabajador/trabajadores] or even “producer(s)” [productor/productores]
was more frequent in the second period. “Producer(s)” would become, over time, the
common corporatist term for referring to the working class (see Figure 4). Together
with nationalism, Catholicism would gradually be integrated into corporatist
discourse. The message was coherent with regard to the discourse's distribution: the
“producers” would not act in society by pursuing their own interest, as occurred in
liberal capitalism. Rather, they would act in the nation's best interests.16 In addition,
the “producers” would also act for God's greater glory. Nationalism and religion
ended up modelling the anti-competition rhetoric in Spain during the first half of the
twentieth century. In the 1930s, conservative intellectuals and politicians had already
developed a corporatist, coherent system of ideas. It was integrated with a broad
movement called “Social Catholicism”.17
Growing Spanish nationalism was accompanied in the Basque region by
strong attacks against the political elite groups of the constitutional regime and, in
general, against any sort of liberal government. Many articles from the two periods
maintained that the Spanish state was “in decline”, “lethargic” and “corrupt”, in
contrast with the drive and vigour of industrial regions such as Catalonia and the
Basque Provinces. In both regions, local anti-Spanish breeds of nationalism were
strengthened during the European war. Nevertheless, in the Basque region the greater
part of the economic elite groups steered clear from separatism, and also fought
against it politically. Despite this, the intellectuals who favoured the business owners
used an anti-Madrid rhetoric that in a way was in tune with separatism.18 The
objectives were nonetheless very different. Whereas separatism attempted to break
away from the state, the goal of the Basque economic elite groups was to conquer it.
16 For instance, in Joaquín Adán: “El peligro de desorganización obrera”, Información , 29 de agosto:
507-508; “El fascismo ante los problemas sociales”, Información, November 29th, 1920: 699-700.
17 See Fraile (1998), pp. 172 y ss. However, corporatism was not the product of a particular political
culture. Spain was more catholic than Portugal, and Colombia more than Brazil, and the latter reached
a higher level of corporatization. Schmitter (1974), pp. 89-90.
18 See Antonio Dubois: “La crisis y los problemas económicos”, Economía Vasca, January 31th, 1922:
2-3; Antonio Dubois:“El enigma económico”, Economía Vasca, February 22th, 1922: 4-5; Domingo
Pando Ortiz: “La colaboración comercial del Estado”, Información, May 29th, 1922: 304; Pedro Antín
y Olave: “Orientaciones económicas”, El Nervión, November 15th, 1922.
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To do so, Basque intellectuals extolled the virtues of the local public administration
(provincial governments called Diputaciones, city councils) versus the inefficiency or
“dirtiness” of government institutions such as ministry delegations or the postal
service.
FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE
Corporatist writers insisted that the people of Vizcaya were a “strong”,
industrial “powerful” and “energetic” people. Faced with the “meridionalism” and
“rottenness” of state institutions, the Basque “race” had the duty, given its moral
superiority, to regenerate the entire country.19 According to intellectuals such as
Ramón de Basterra, Amadeo de Mendiluce, Santiago de Urcelay, Rafael Sánchez
Mazas, Joaquín Adán or the businessman José Félix de Lequerica, the task of the
Basque economic groups was supposed to be almost one of “colonizing”. Bilbao was
a “strong” and “anxious” city in a similar fashion to German or American industrial
cities. It had nothing to do with the “corruption in Madrid”. The Basques had already
exercised “economic imperialism” with their heavy investments in other regions of
Spain since the beginning of the twentieth century. Now they had the duty of
obtaining decision-making power or clearly influencing it. In this regard, and to
reinforce the argument, it was commonplace to praise the virtues of major
industrialists, especially the first generation of businessmen who “without any
psychological debility” had led the region's industrialization since the 1870s.20 This
rhetoric of “force” and “energy” fit in well with a region that had grown economically
with a heavy industry model. Dictator Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) would employ
19 See Archivo de la Cámara de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Bilbao, exp. 1981, “Asamblea
regia – Instituto”, El Heraldo de Madrid, August 28th, 1915.
20 José Félix de Lequerica: “Los hombres de Bilbao”, Información, Suplemento Extraordinario
(Artículos publicados en La Esfera el 12 de agosto de 1916), August 31th, 1916: 649-650. Ramón de
Basterra: “El poder de Bilbao”, in Basterra (1998) [1917]: 63-103. Adán, Joaquín, “Vizcaya en la
unidad económica española. Conferencia pronunciada en la Cámara de Comercio de Madrid, el día 19
de mayo de 1934”, in Adán (1944): vol.2, 143; Pedro Rico:“La formación de un espíritu económico
vasco”, Economía Vasca, March 25th, 1922: 7; Amadeo M. de Mendiluce, “Vizcaya. Impresiones y
comentarios”, El Financiero, 1922: 85-88. Miguel de Unamuno also hoped that a nueva política
emerged from Bilbao. Miguel de Unamuno: “Bilbao y la nueva política”, Hermes, n. LXIV, October
1917, in Unamuno (1998): 269-271 En 1919 Joaquín Adán pointed out that Spanish government has
done nothing to protect disabled people: only Vizcaya had implemented the first plan: “Los inválidos
de la paz”, Información , February 28th, 1919: 111-112. Santiago de Urcelay also insisted that Vizcaya
had a developed social welfare system, unlike the rest of Spain: “El retiro obrero y las inversiones
sociales, II”, El Nervión, June 21th, 1921.
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these ideas upon exposing the need to develop a “virile” economic and social policy
in Spain.21
Figure 4 reflects what we have just stated. For example, the word “state” is
used much more: from 0.98‰ from 1914-1916 to 2.19‰ from 1920-1922. The word
“bureaucracy”, usually used pejoratively in Spanish, wet from 0,10 to 0,49‰, and the
word “liberal”, almost always used in a negative context, from 0.15‰ to 0.37‰.
Regeneration and the promotion of sustained and more “balanced” economic growth
were called “reconstitution” in that era. This word would be added progressively to
the corporatist vocabulary: from 2 occurrences in 1914-1916, it increased to 44
occurrences in 1920-1922.
Another of the axes of the new corporatist discourse was the request for
greater government intervention in economic affairs. As may be observed, the word
“intervention” went from 151th to 59th place in the second period. The terms
“Madrid”, “Ministry” and “minister” were also used somewhat more. Finally, the
words “promotion” [fomento] and “development” were used more than double in the
second sample. In spite of the desire for greater state intervention in the economy and
in relations between employers and workers, corporatist writers always made it clear
that holding private property was indispensable. Forming vertical compulsory unions
was recommendable. They would be organized by production sectors or subsectors.
However, under no circumstances should they intervene in companies' systems of
internal organization. Figure 4 reflects the growing concern in texts for matters
concerning “private property”. Both words together went from a use of 0.07‰ to
0.23‰. Vicente Gay was one of the greatest defenders of private property and
maintaining business owners' independence in company management. According to
this writer, capital deserved “special consideration and care; not in a privileged sense,
but rather a demand from the very nature of things.”22 Furthermore, capital was
linked to the existence of a superior and well educated class that was essential for the
economy to work. Articles about possible attacks on private property were common
in 1920 when the Social Reform Institute, a state-run organization created in 1903 to
21 The first Manifesto of Primo de Rivera already proclaimed that the coup was a virile movement. See
El Nervión, September 14th, 1923.
22 Vicente Gay: “La defensa del capital”, El Financiero, n. 980, January 9th, 1920: 40-41.
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improve the standard of living among the working class, studied some sort of worker
intervention in large companies. 23
The organicism of corporatist intellectuals fits in well with this type of
argument. Workers could never replace business owners because they had been
trained “in the school of economic life” for generations. Companies had to be in the
hands of their owners and “technicians”, who were those who knew how to direct and
manage them. The defence of private property and capitalist order; the functional
hierarchization of society —owners with business know-how, technicians, workers,
all of them “producers”; and the state's role as custodian or arbiter became the basic
axes of corporate nature. This was the “modern” way of facing “new” post-war
problems. Society had to be highly organized and hierarchical. A “technical class”
had to play the most important role. Figure 4 includes data of the use of the words
“system”, that reflects the desire for order and organization, and “technical” [técnica],
much more frequently in the second sample than in the first one.
An interventionist, anti-competition and organicist rhetoric had to attack trade
and finance. Merchants were billed as guilty of the economic cycle's fluctuations.
Trade tended toward speculation, and speculation brought about a scarcity of food
and other basic goods. This caused unrest among the working class. Stock exchange
speculators also generated economic crises. Production, “work” was imposed in
answer to trade and finance.24 The great industrial companies were more desirable to
small businesses. It was preferable to eliminate intermediaries. Financial investments
were considered to be unproductive. Antonio Dubois, in the Bilbao Chamber of
Commerce's journal, proposed Germany as a model to imitate: it was the country that
had best achieved “a rational organization of its production” through the creation of
cartels. German industry was “disciplined” and “organically organized”. Moreover,
the German economy had managed to decrease the influence of “high trade” by
placing it under the rule of industry.25
23 “Necesidad de una política social”, Información, November 15th, 1920: 660. Pedro Gual Villalba:
“La participación en los beneficios”, Información , August 28th, 1920: 495-496.
24 Ángel Guerra: “Un peligro para la raza”, El Noticiero Bilbaíno , February 18th, 1921; “El momento
actual”, Información, January 14th, 1921: 8.
25 Antonio Dubois, “El capitalismo y el régimen de concurrencia. Los Cartels en Alemania”,
Información, March 30th, 1918: 169-171. “La depresión económica de España”, El Noticiero Bilbaíno,
August 4th, 1920; S. Olmedo y Estrada: “La hora del bien. Por la clase media”, El Nervión, October
8th, 1920.
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Corporatist writers also criticized the nouveau riche, those who had reaped
unforeseen earnings during the war without any effort at all. These groups had
amassed fortunes with stock speculation or opportunist business ventures. They were
accused of not having any moral scruples, publicly showing off their wealth when a
general increase in price for basic food stuffs was occurring. 26 In other words, not
only were they modifying the traditional pre-war order, they were also exacerbating
the class conflict. As a result, it was quite common for the press to speak of the need
to “ban” luxury and return to the simplicity and restraint of traditional customs.27 This
was especially the case during the inflationary boom of 1920, when the rise in price
for foodstuffs for the lower classes contrasted with the prosperity of the new wealthy
classes. In light of ostentation, people had to return to the pre-war “simplicity”. It was
absolutely necessary to establish “moral norms” for the behaviour of economic and
social participants.28 T. Mendivi proposed a “League for the defence and propagation
of wearing espadrilles” and, in general, a national anti-luxury movement.29 Faced
with squandering money, the need to inculcate saving and planning ahead was
encouraged among the middle and working class. 30
3. The influence of the context on the output and interpretation of
the text
In this section, we study to what extent the economic and social conditions we
discussed in the first section influenced the production and interpretation of discourse.
In other words, we analyze the influence that context exercised on the production of
the set of statements that gradually modelled corporatist discourse during World War
I and the immediate post-war period as well as the influence that context had on the
26 V. de Burgos: “La crisis económica y moral”, El Noticiero Bilbaíno, April 13th, 1921.
27 José Elías de Molins: “La producción y el ahorro en el consumo”, El Nervión, August 5th, 1920.
Pedro A. de Otaduy: “De la crisis industrial y comercial”, El Nervión, August 30th, 1922.
28 Ángel Guerra: “Economías”, El Nervión, December 12th, 1919; Ángel Guerra: “Lujo y miseria”, El
Noticiero Bilbaíno, September 27th, 1919.
29 “La alpargata se aristocratiza”, El Liberal, May 11th, 1920. T. Mendivi: “Zapato de cuerda,
etcétera”, El Liberal, May 11th, 1920.
30 José de Posse y Villelga:“ La eficacia del ahorro. La acción previsora: el ejemplo de los Estados
beligerantes, II”, Información, July 29th, 1915: 624-626; “El ahorro escolar”, Información, January
11th, 1917: 15-16; Ana María Múgica, “La economía y la previsión en la niñez”, El Nervión, January
24th, 1920.
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way in which the texts were interpreted.31 In short, we studied discourse as a process
of social interaction. 32
Discourse involves social conditions on different levels: the immediate social
environment in which the discourse occurs; the level of the social institutions, which
constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse; and the level of the society as a whole.
These social conditions at those varied levels influence the processes of production
and interpretation of the texts.33 In the production process, the text is a product; in the
interpretation process, the text is a resource. This paper argues that the set of
statements that ended up comprising the corporatist discourse were the product of
four social conditions: i) changes in the economic structure that occurred during the
European war. On an international scale, there was an increase in competition
between domestic economies due to monetary instability (devaluation of the mark
and franc) and problems of overproduction, especially in the heavy industry. Within
Spain, the Basque region was especially punished by the post-war crisis. There were
saturation problems in old industries and a decline in production costs. ii) The
exacerbation of the class conflict that brought about a search to incorporate the
working class into the system, especially after what occurred in Russia in 1917. iii)
The liberal political elite's inability to incorporate the status groups more closely
within the political process. iiii) The appearance of new social groups that threatened
the hegemony of the traditional regional elite groups, at least in the case of Vizcaya.34
Out of the four conditions listed, what stands out is the fact that most of them
were brought about by the European war; in other words, by an outside factor.
Perhaps the exception is the third condition as the economic elite groups of the
Basque region had begun to harshly criticize the liberal political class starting in
1909. Another exception would be a structural condition that we have not yet
mentioned: the concentration of property and the appearance of financial capitalism,
in the case of Northern Spain starting in approximately 1900. Thus, the production of
the corporatist discourse basically appears tied to needs for legitimization,
acceptability and domination by certain elite groups whose hegemony was threatened
by the upheaval brought on by World War I. With regard to the text interpretation
31 See Blommaert (2005): 39-67.
32 On the relationship between discourse and society, Van Dijk (1997), Fairclough (2004).
33 Fairclough (2004): 8, Figure 2.1.
34 A theoretical approach about the issue in Schmitter (1979) [1974]: 24-25.
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process, the corporatist discourse attempted to exploit middle class fear of the
revolutionary worker movement, nationalism, the need for order, the proposal of an
organic system and the attack on new groups who became rich off of the war.
FIGURE 5 HERE
In Figure 5, I have made a summary of the relationship between text and
context that was gradually modelled after 1918. Faced with problems of
overproduction and saturation, corporatist texts exposed the advantages of
cartelization —German industry's “superior organization”; and the need for public
works and greater state intervention. In the case of the Basque region, many writers
urgently asked the state to invest in building a secondary railroad network in order to
meet the demand of the iron and steel industry and restructure the naval construction
industry. In light of growing competition of foreign manufactured goods, the
corporatist discourse incorporated economic nationalism, the infant industry
argument and the need for a “domestic reconstitution”. This “reconstitution” could
not come about if the growth of domestic industry was not promoted. Faced with the
growing class conflict, the following was proposed: vertical organization of unions,
the obligation to join a union, economic nationalism and the implementation of an
organic system in which “producers” instead of “workers” would exist. Private
property was defended against a possible intervention of unions in company
management. Business owners comprised a “technical class” that could not be
replaced. As they were faced with the independence of the liberal political elite and
the problems of Basque economic elite groups to access decision making, the text
exhibited the “parasitism” of Spanish bureaucracy, Madrid's lethargy and the Castile's
decline in contrast with the drive and vigour of the outlying industrial regions.
Corporatist intellectuals advocated the establishment of a system of functionally
organized representation. As the parliament was supposedly incapable of solving
problems, they set their sights on vertical or functional representation. This was the
only type of representation that could solve “modern” problems that Western
societies had to face at the beginning of the 1920s. With the intensity of the business
cycle, they proposed to control the competition, cartelization of the industry and
16
order. Financial speculators and merchants were blamed for aggravating cyclical
fluctuations. In response to the new elite groups who became rich off of the war, they
were accused of lacking morals and aggravating the class conflict with ostentation
and luxury.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the relationship between language and economics, between
text and context, through a case study. Our analysis has focused on an industrial
region in Northern Spain during the European war and the immediate post-war
period. The results suggest that the context was a determining factor in the process of
construction and distribution of the corporatist discourse. Changes in the economic
structure occurring during the period, especially serious for the Basque region, caused
the local elite economic groups to need major transformations in public policies and
even profound institutional changes. These changes were necessary for reproducing
their dominance in a situation of economic distress. However, they could only
achieve them through constructing sets of statements that reinforced their legitimacy;
and, at the same time, the statements had to fulfil a mobilizing function against the
liberal political class. The reason is that this ruling class was obstructing access to
decision making. A construction process was gradually established, and links were
established between the different statements until a coherent discursive line was
formed at the beginning of the 1920s. The pieces began falling into place around
basic concepts such as order, industry, work, organicism, functionalism and force.
The paper has demonstrated that context clearly determined the text's construction.
This contradicts the Foucaldian theory that considers that the most important factor is
the intrinsic structure of discourse. Though it is true that discourse tends toward
inclusiveness, and it tends to colonize the world imperialistically, one cannot forget
that it was produced, at least in this case, buy some economic elite groups whose
hegemonic position was endangered. In other words, reality created the discourse and
not vice versa.
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FIGURE 1. Economic Distress (I): Industrial Production Indices in Spain, Catalonia
and Basque Region, 1890-1935 (1913=100)
Sources and specifications: IPIEUZ (Basque Country) in Carreras (1985); the IPIPV (Basque Country) was built
by Parejo (2004), with more series (64) than the IPIEUZ (17); the IPICAT (Catalonia) also by Parejo
(2004); the IPIE (Spain), elaborated by Prados (2003). The first three indices have been rescaled in
1913=100. The AHV (Altos Hornos de Vizcaya) index has been built with data from Houpt (1998), II. It is a
production index of Sestao and Baracaldo factories (located near Bilbao) for 1902-1921.
FIGURE 2. Economic Distress (II): Nominal and Real Prices in Stock Market. Altos
Hornos de Vizcaya and Compañía del Norte in the Bilbao Stock Exchange, 1913-
1936
Sources and specifications: Bilbao Stock Exchange, Official Bulletins 1913-1936; and Información (Bilbao
Chamber of Commerce). Monthly averages calculated with daily data. Given to the absence of monthly
price indices, the series have been deflated with a monthly price index of steel products, taken from
Houpt (1998, II), and weighted by sales volume. August 1917 and June-July 1922 (strikes) have been
substituted by and average of the previous and following month.
Source and Specifications: Four daily newspapers (El Nervión, El Noticiero Bilbaíno, El Pueblo Vasco and La Gaceta del Norte) and the.financial magazine
Información (owned by the Bilbao Chamber of Commerce). Processed with Concordance. Ranks, averages and ratios calculated taking into account meaning
ocurrences. Words: España-español-española-españoles-españolas; nación-nacional-nacionales; nuestro-nuestros-nuestras; obrero-obreros-obrera-obreras; clase-
clases. Ranking until 200th place.
FIGURE 3. Nationalist Markers: Ocurrences in 1914/1916 and 1920/1922
1914/1916 1920/1922
Ocurrences Rank Total
ocurrences
Mean per 1000
words (A)
Ocurrences Rank Total
ocurrences
Mean per 1000
words (B)
Ratio
B/A
Total words (tokens) 59024 - 59024 - 228344 - 228344 - -
Total words (types) 10352 - 10352 - 19707 - 19707 - -
[Spain][Spanish][gender][plural][gender] 96/22/35/17/8 9/91/40/119/>200 178 3,02 558/119/187/98/147 4/75/33/99/38 1109 4,86 1,61
[nation][national][plural] 8/51/13 >200/25/>200 72 1,22 112/284/199 68/17/29 595 2,61 2,14
[our][plural][gender] 14/15/7 150/137/>200 36 0,61 88/102/65 113/88/171 255 1,12 1,83
[worker][plural][gender][plural] 97/145/22/17 8/2/87/118 281 4,76 288/404/102/149 16/8/88/37 943 4,13 0,87
[Class][plural] 67/55 16/19 122 2,07 151/47 41/>200 198 0,87 0,42
FIGURE 4. Anti-Competition and Corporatist Markers: Ocurrences in 1914/1916 and 1920/1922
1914/1916 1920/1922
Ocurrences Rank Total
ocurrences
Mean per 1000
words (A)
Ocurrences Rank Total
ocurrences
Mean per 1000
words (B)
Ratio
B/A
[state] 58 17 58 0,98 501 5 501 2,19 2,23
[industry][plural][industrial] 45/18/42 28/110/34 105 1,78 433/100/89 7/89/112 622 2,72 1,53
[burocracy][liberal] 3/6 >200/>200 9 0,15 29/55 >200/188 84 0,37 2,46
[public]+[works] 23 [78] 23 0,39 115 [67] 115 0,50 1,29
[system] 30 53 30 0,51 188 32 188 0,82 1,62
[government] 48 26 48 0,81 171 36 171 0,75 0,92
[promotion][development] 31/20 50/93 51 0,86 122/276 66/14 398 1,74 2,02
[luxury] 4 >200 4 0,07 63 176 63 0,28 4,07
[producer][plural] 7/2 >200/>200 9 0,15 12/48 >200/>200 60 0,26 1,72
[private]+[property] 4 >200 4 0,07 53 [185] 53 0,23 3,42
[corporatist][corporatism] 0/2 >200/>200 2 0,03 23/74 >200/164 97 0,42 12,54
[Madrid][Ministry][minister] 20/26/20 97/66/97 66 1,12 135/118/32 58/66/>200 285 1,25 1,12
[cartel][plural]* 4 >200 4 0,07 33/7 >200/>200 40 0,18 2,58
[reconstitution] 2 >200 3 0,05 44 >200 44 0,19 3,79
[technical] 17 118 17 0,29 142 47 142 0,62 2,16
[intervention] 14 151 14 0,24 136 59 136 0,60 2,51
Source and specifications: Based on the same sources of Figure 3. Words: Estado; industria-industrias-industrial; burocracia-liberal; obras+públicas; sistema; gobierno;
fomento-desarrollo; lujo; productor-productores; propiedad+privada; corporativista-corporativismo; Madrid-Ministerio-Ministro; cártel-cárteles; reconstitución;
técnica; intervención. * “Cartel”, “cartels” and “cártels” included.
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FIGURE 5. Dissecting the Corporatist Discourse in Northern Spain (1918-1923): Context
and Statements
CONTEXT TEXT TEXT TEXT
Overproduction - saturation Advantages of cartelization Public works "Reconstitution"
Foreign competition Nationalism "Infant industry" argument Idem
Class conflict Compulsory tradeunionism Not "workers" but “producers” Nationalism
Conflict with liberal elite "Parasitism" "Functionalism" Castilian decadence
Conflict with parliament Modern problems Idem Idem
Defence of big business Order Social protection "Technical class"
Defence of private property "Technical class" Order “Work”
Business cycle intensity Blaming "trade" Blaming "speculators",
"financiers"
Defence of
"production", cartels,
order
New elites New rich Speculators, "hoarders" Luxury, not "work"
